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An Empirical Study of the Effect of the Internet on Fares 
in the U.S. Airline Industry 
By HWA RYUNG LEE* 
A reduction in search costs is generally believed to make markets more 
competitive. However, the effect may be mitigated or amplified if 
consumers must pay costs for switching products. This paper 
investigates how search costs affect prices in the presence of switching 
costs using U.S. domestic airfare data for 2000–2010. The airline 
industry experienced a dramatic decrease in search costs with 
increasing Internet use in the 2000s. At the same time, the industry is 
known for its frequent flyer programs (FFPs), which increase 
switching costs for consumers. We use the average network size of 
airlines in a market as a proxy for switching costs related to FFPs and 
Internet usage as a proxy for (the inverse of) search costs. The results 
show that increasing Internet usage lowers airfares but that the effect 
is smaller for markets with a larger average network size. 
Key Word: Search costs, Switching costs, Internet, Frequent Flyer 
Program, Airline industry 
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   I. Introduction 
 
earch costs are dramatically reduced in the Internet era, as consumers can easily 
and quickly compare products on the web. Firms have feared whether the 
decrease in search costs associated with increasing Internet use would intensify 
competition. The airline industry is one of the industries greatly affected by the 
rapidly increasing use of the Internet, and previous research has found that Internet 
use has led to lower airfares (Brunger 2010, Orlov 2011, Verlinda and Lane 2004). 
However, the industry is also known for successful loyalty programs called frequent 
flyer programs (FFPs), which create artificial switching costs. When consumers incur 
costs when switching products, the effect of the search cost reduction on prices may be 
smaller. This paper discusses theoretical ambiguities in relation to this and assesses this 
problem empirically in the context of the effect of the Internet on airfares.
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The presence of switching costs offers less flexibility to consumers and renders 
market power to firms. Search costs have similar effects in that consumers become 
less responsive to prices. Accordingly, it appears natural to expect that a decrease 
in search costs will intensify price competition but that switching costs will hinder 
the competition arising from the reduced search costs. 
In a dynamic setting, however, the effect of search and switching costs can be 
more complicated. Given that switching costs provide firms with market power 
over locked-in customers, the equilibrium price will be driven by two opposing 
forces: exploiting the existing customer base with high prices (“harvest”) or 
winning market share with low prices in anticipation of ripping off those customers 
later (“invest”). Similarly, if consumers tend to seek out the products they 
previously purchased before searching for other products,1 search costs give firms 
additional power to lock in customers and present a contrast between investing and 
harvesting incentives. In sum, it is ambiguous as to whether switching costs would 
raise prices, whether a reduction in search costs would lower prices, and whether 
switching costs would mitigate or amplify the effect of search cost reduction. 
We use U.S. domestic airfare data for 2000–2010 to assess the price effects of 
search and switching costs empirically. The average Internet usage in the endpoint 
cities of a route is used as a proxy for (the inverse of) search costs in the market 
(i.e., the route).2 We measure the size of the route network in three different ways 
and use those measures as proxies for switching costs related to FFPs.3 This is 
motivated by the fact that the value of an FFP is highly dependent on the size of an 
airline’s route network; the more destinations an airline has, the easier it is for 
customers to accumulate mileage and use it to get where they want to go. 
A regression analysis of market average fares suggests that switching costs 
reduce the price competition arising from a decrease in search costs. Specifically, 
we find that fares decrease with Internet use but that the fare reduction is less with 
a larger average network size of competing airlines on a route. This result suggests 
that switching costs allow firms to stay in a less competitive pricing regime when 
search costs decrease.  
The results have implications on potential policies. Although this work implicitly 
takes search and switching costs as exogenously given, firms may be able to affect 
those costs strategically. For example, as a response to declining search costs with 
the increasing use of the Internet, firms may attempt to increase switching costs to 
stifle competition arising from declining search costs. A policy aiming to reduce 
one of the costs may also evoke reactions by firms to offset the effect of the cost 
decrease. Thus, the dynamic interaction between the two costs and the potential 
reactions of firms should be considered to improve the effectiveness of policies. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
related literature. Section 3 discusses the ambiguity related to the combined effect 
of search and switching costs. Section 4 describes the empirical model and data. 
1Alternatively, we can think of the case in which consumers are better-informed about the products they 
previously purchased and need to incur extra costs to get information about the other products. 
2Throughout this paper, we use “route” and “market” interchangeably. 
3Borenstein (1989) noted the presence of a hub premium related to FFPs and Lederman (2007) disentangled 
the value of FFPs from the advantages of being a dominant firm. They attribute the price premium to switching 
costs arising from FFPs. 
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Section 5 discusses the estimation results. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6. 
  
II. Literature Review 
 
This paper is related to three streams of literature: studies on switching costs; 
studies on search costs, especially in the context of the effect of the Internet on 
competition; and studies on airline competition in the Internet era. There is a large 
body of literature on both search costs and switching costs. Empirical studies have 
noted that many industries exhibit some type of switching costs. In the market for 
bank loans, consumers who switch lose the value of the relationship with a bank 
arising from information asymmetry (Kim, Kliger, and Vale 2003); in the market 
for toll-free services, prices fell as 800-numbers became portable (Viard 2007); in 
the markets for refrigerated orange juice and margarine, consumers behave as if 
they obtain additional utility from purchasing products they previously purchased 
or, equivalently, they suffer psychological costs when switching brands (Dubé, 
Hitsch, and Rossi 2010); and so on.4 
A large body of theoretical literature on switching costs contrasts the opposing 
incentives in a dynamic setting, including the incentive to win new customers by 
lowering prices and the incentive to exploit locked-in customers by raising prices. 
In these studies, predictions of the relationship between switching costs and 
competition are ambiguous. Klemperer (1987) and Beggs and Klemperer (1992) 
demonstrate that markets are generally less competitive with rather than without 
switching costs, as forward-looking consumers expect that switching costs will 
make them less flexible in the future and that firms will exploit them by charging 
high prices. As a result, consumers become less sensitive to current prices; thus, the 
investment incentive dominates. On the other hand, Cabral and Villas-Boas (2005) 
demonstrate that switching costs can make markets more competitive, as the 
strategic effect (that is, competition to win market share) outweighs the direct 
effect (that is, price increases to exploit existing customers) of switching costs as 
an example of the “Bertrand Supertrap.” Dubé, Hisch, and Rossi (2009) establish a 
U-shaped relationship between price and switching costs using the infinite-horizon 
model, in which the lock-in factor is allowed to be imperfect. Shin and Sudhir 
(2009) and Cabral (2009) came up with simpler models that produce some 
empirical implications given by Dubé, Hisch and Rossi (2009). Shin and Sudhir 
(2009) recover the U-shaped relationship between price and switching costs using a 
two-period Hotelling model when firms cannot discriminate between locked-in and 
non-locked-in consumers. Meanwhile, Cabral (2009) highlights the result from 
Cabral (2008), which showed that price is decreasing in switching costs when 
switching costs are low. Cabral (2008, 2009) allows for price discrimination and 
determines whether the investing effect or the harvesting effect dominates. Farrell 
and Klemperer (2007) conduct an extensive survey on switching costs. 
The literature on search costs is mostly interested in their relationship with price 
4There are numerous other industry studies that identify switching costs or the effect of switching costs. For 
example, see Borenstein (1991) for the market for gasoline, Greenstein (1993) for mainframe computers, Elzinga 
and Mills (1998) for cigarettes, Shy (2002) for the bank deposit industry and the wireless industry, and Honka 
(2014) for the auto insurance industry. 
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dispersion.5 In terms of price levels, theories on search costs generally predict a 
positive relationship between search costs and prices in a static setting. Important 
exceptions include Lal and Sarvary (1999), who demonstrate that a search cost 
reduction can raise prices as consumers can identify the characteristics of products 
better in a vertically differentiated market. There are numerous empirical works 
that examine competition in the Internet era, in which the increasing use of the 
Internet is generally interpreted as a decrease in search costs. The literature mostly 
examines the effect of the Internet on price levels and price dispersions, or the price 
differential between online and offline stores. For example, in the airline industry, 
Brunger (2010) finds that “clearly leisure”6 travelers pay lower average fares when 
purchasing a ticket through internet-based online travel agencies as compared to 
offline travel agencies. Orlov (2011) examines U.S. airline data and finds that, with 
Internet use, airfares decrease and the degree of intrafirm fare dispersion increases, 
whereas the degree of interfirm fare dispersion is unaffected. Verlinda and Lane 
(2004) investigate the effect of search costs on price dispersion characteristics from 
the angle of price discrimination using U.S. airfare data. They find evidence that 
the Internet toughens competition and increases the price dispersion between 
restricted and unrestricted tickets, which is consistent with price discrimination 
through brand differentiation. However, the airline industry can also be 
characterized by switching costs arising from FFPs (Borenstein 1989, Lederman 
2007). This paper assesses the effect of the Internet on airfares with a focus on the 
interaction between search and switching costs. 
Given the vast literature on both search costs and switching costs and the similar 
characteristics of the two costs as types of market friction, there have been 
relatively few attempts to include search and switching costs in one framework. 
Knittle (1997) includes both search and switching costs to explain why competition 
arising from the divestiture of AT&T has not lowered the rates of long distance 
calls, finding supporting evidence that the presence of those costs are major 
sources of market power. In the theory section of the paper, he considered both 
costs and showed that they can result in higher prices in a simple static setting. 
Wilson (2009) offers a unified analysis of search and switching costs in one 
theoretical framework, also in a static setting. 
Farrell and Klemperer (2007) note that researchers often do not distinguish 
between search and switching costs and that search costs can be modelled in a 
manner similar to that of switching costs. Some empirical works note the potential 
dynamic effect of search costs as an alternative explanation of switching costs in 
creating consumer inertia. Moshkin and Shachar (2000) show that both search and 
switching costs can result in persistent market share in a dynamic setting and 
suggest how the two costs can be distinguished from each other empirically. They 
assume a consumer may incur one of the two costs, but not both. In their model, 
past consumption can affect current purchase decisions through either switching 
costs or search costs. Dubé, Hitsch, and Rossi (2010) attempt to identify the reason 
for consumer inertia by testing predictions considering the three different factors of 
5See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2005) for a survey on search costs and price dispersion. 
6Travelers are defined as “Clearly Leisure” if their travel characteristics correspond to leisure rather than 
business travel, in particular, if tickets were purchased more than 14 days before departure, and their itinerary 
included an extended stay over a weekend. 
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switching costs, search costs, and learning. They find evidence consistent with 
consumer behavior in the presence of switching costs rather than search costs or 
learning. Honka (2014) includes both types of cost in her model to quantify search 
and switching costs using data from the U.S. auto insurance industry. However, 
these prior works do not consider the interaction between search and switching 
costs in determining prices. Here, in contrast, the interaction between the two costs 
is the main interest. The price effect of a reduction in search costs in the presence 
of switching costs is theoretically ambiguous and becomes an empirical question. 
 
III. Conceptual Framework 
 
Search costs and switching costs are types of market friction that work in a 
similar fashion. In a static setting, the two costs make demand less elastic. In a 
dynamic setting, firms are faced with two opposing forces - investing incentives 
and harvesting incentives - in the presence of switching costs. A similar dynamic 
effect arises with search costs if previous purchases induce consumers to seek out 
the same products again before other products, as consumers are better informed 
about products they previously purchased. Search costs are distinguished from 
switching costs, as they affect even consumers not locked into any product. 
It is also important to note that search costs and switching costs can influence 
both search and switching behavior. To switch, consumers would need to search for 
other products. If consumers are unlikely to switch, they would not search, even 
with low search costs. Search costs and switching costs jointly shape consumer 
behavior and determine market prices. In sum, the effect of search costs on firms’ 
pricing decisions in the presence of switching costs would differ depending on 
which incentive, investment or harvesting, overwhelms. 
Suppose that switching costs are so large that no one switches. Locked-in 
consumers who would never switch would never search for other products in the 
first place. Any search cost reduction is then irrelevant to those locked-in 
consumers, and the dynamic, lock-in effect of search costs can thus be ignored. 
On the other hand, a decrease in search costs would make firms act more 
aggressively to win those consumers without purchase histories, that is, those who 
are not locked into any product. Firms have a strong incentive to lure non-locked-in 
consumers as, once consumers buy their products, those consumers will be fully 
locked in to them in the future and the firms will enjoy a monopolist position. This 
effect will be greater in the presence of larger switching costs, as the monopolist 
profit a firm can extract from locked-in consumers increases with switching costs. 
Thus, a decrease in search costs will make markets even tougher in the presence of 
larger switching costs. 
Now suppose that consumers do not incur any costs when switching. Consumers 
may still be locked into the product they purchased previously if they have to pay 
costs to become informed about other products. Consumers would not search and 
switch if the search is a costly process. As in the presence of switching costs, firms 
will then be faced with the incentive to exploit their customer base as well as the 
incentive to invest in market share. In addition, search costs make demand less 
elastic and so may curb the incentive to earn customers by cutting prices. In sum, a 
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decrease in search costs undermines firms’ abilities to harvest, while it has an 
ambiguous effect on the investing incentive. 
The price effect of a reduction in the search cost is complicated by the presence 
of switching costs. Unless switching costs are high enough to guarantee full lock-in, 
switching costs and search costs jointly determine the degree of lock-in. Let us 
suppose that switching costs are relatively low such that consumers may actually 
switch from one product to another, for example, to seek a better match with their 
tastes. As long as the combination of search and switching costs creates enough 
friction to lock consumers into the product previously purchased, firms will be able 
to sustain a monopolist position over those locked-in consumers. Thus, while 
search costs are declining, firms are more likely to sustain their lock-in power in 
the presence of larger switching costs. At the same time, however, both the 
harvesting incentive and the investing incentive will be enhanced by switching 
costs, as the extent to which firms can exploit locked-in consumers increases with 
switching costs. 
The market price will be determined as a result of the balance between the 
incentive to exploit locked-in consumers and the incentive to retain the customer 
base and poach rivals’ customers. As discussed previously, which incentive would 
overwhelm depends on the respective sizes and the combined size of the search 
costs and switching costs. The overall effect of a search cost reduction in the 
presence of switching costs is theoretically ambiguous and becomes an empirical 
question, as noted earlier. 
 
IV. Empirical Specification and Data 
 
A. Empirical Specification 
 
The previous section discussed the ambiguity of the price effect of a search cost 
reduction in the presence of switching costs. The airline industry is particularly 
suitable for assessing this effect. The airline industry experienced a dramatic 
decrease in search costs with increasing Internet use in the 2000s. Consumers can 
sort tickets by prices or other ticket characteristics and find attractive alternatives 
with only a few clicks. They can also check out other travel agency websites, price 
comparison sites, and airline websites for better deals quickly and easily. The 
increase in Internet use is an external shock to the industry that reduces search 
costs and is unrelated to the level of switching costs. We use the average Internet 
use at the endpoint airports of a route as a proxy for search costs (as measured 
inversely). Internet use may not reduce the total time spent on searching, as the 
Internet may idle people. Here, we may interpret search costs as the minimum time 
and effort needed to find relevant information. As consumers are better informed, 
their consideration sets will be widened and they will become more flexible. 
The airline industry is also characterized by the presence of significant switching 
costs. Major airlines have FFPs that encourage repeated purchases. These have 
been regarded as one of the most successful marketing strategies. FFPs reward a 
consumer who accumulates mileage to a certain level with a bonus ticket. In other 
words, a consumer has to forgo the opportunity to gain a bonus ticket when buying 
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from another airline. Those switching costs arising from FFPs are proportional to 
the extensiveness of the route network, as consumers would find it easier to 
accumulate and redeem mileage when an airline serves more destinations. In this 
sense, we use different measures of the average network size of airlines on a route 
as a proxy for switching costs in the market. 
Markets are defined as a trip from an origin airport to a destination airport. The 
data used in this analysis presents both cross-sectional and over-time variations in 
Internet use and in the airline network size. This allows us to identify the effects of 
search costs, switching costs, and the interaction between the two costs on the 
average market fare. 
In particular, we estimate the following fixed-effect model: 
  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝛽𝛽 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 +𝛾𝛾3𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∙ 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛿𝛿𝑟𝑟 + 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 
  
Here, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 denotes the number-of-passengers weighted-average fare in market 
r at time 𝐼𝐼; Network𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is the average network size of the airlines competing in 
market r at time t, measured in a number of different ways; Internet𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is the 
average internet penetration rate in the two endpoint regions of market r at time t; X𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is a set of control variables; δ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is a fixed effect for the pair of market r and 
quarter q of time t; δ𝑟𝑟 is a fixed effect for time t; and 𝜖𝜖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is a random error with 
zero mean. 
Market-quarter fixed effects (δ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) are included to control for the unobserved, 
time-invariant component of a route and route-specific seasonality; and time-fixed 
effects (δ𝑟𝑟 ) are included to account for time-specific components - common 
demand/supply shocks - unobserved by researchers. 
Specifically, the Internet penetration rate in the region where an airport is located 
is measured by the proportion of people having Internet access in the region. The 
Internet penetration rate differs across regions and over time. Internet denotes the 
average Internet penetration rate in the two endpoint regions of a given market, i.e., 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 = (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟)/2, 
 
where 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟) is the proportion of people having Internet access 
at time t in the region where the origin (destination) airport of market r is located. 
An airline’s network size at an airport is measured by the number of destinations 
that the airline serves originating from the airport, and the airline’s network size in 
a market is measured by the average network size of the airline at the endpoint 
airports of the market. In particular, we devise a network size variable, 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟, 
by taking the average of the direct network size of airlines. Specifically, we first 
compute the simple average of the number of destinations to which a carrier 
operates a direct flight at each of the two endpoint airports of a given market, after 
which we take the average of the values across all airlines serving the market 
multiplied by the number-of-passengers weights, i.e., 
𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =�(𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ∙ 12 (𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
+ 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟))/2, 
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where 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is the market share of carrier c in market r at time t; C is the set of 
carriers competing in market r at time t; and 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼
𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟) is the number of 
destinations to which carrier c operates a direct flight from the origin (destination) 
airport of market r at time t. 
As robustness checks, two alternative measures of network size are considered 
with different variables for 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 and 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟. First, consumers may consider the 
number of destinations they can reach regardless of the identity of an operating 
airline and whether they can take a direct flight or not. To reflect this point, we 
additionally consider the destinations served by only connecting flights and code-
sharing flights. In this case, 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 represents the number of destinations that 
carrier c serves from the origin (destination) airport of market r at time t. Second, 
consumers may care about the frequency of flights rather than the number of 
destinations when evaluating FFPs because it would be easier for them to 
accumulate and use mileages when there are more flights. We consider this by 
constructing an alternative measure of Network based on the number of direct 
flights operated by an airline from the endpoint airports.7 Specifically, 𝑌𝑌𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 is 
the number of direct flights of carrier c from the origin (destination) airport of 
market r at time t. 
𝑋𝑋𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 is a set of control variables that accounts for the average product 
characteristics and market structure. Suppressing the market and time notations (r, 
t), the average product characteristics include the fraction of direct flights among 
all itineraries (Direct); the fraction of round-trip tickets among all itineraries 
(Round); and the average extra miles flown of all itineraries (ExtraMiles). 
ExtraMiles is zero if an itinerary is served by a non-stop, direct flight. For 
connecting flights, the variable is measured by taking the difference between the 
actual flown miles and the non-stop miles flown. Variables of the market structure 
include whether a low-cost carrier (LCC) serves market r at time t (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟); the 
number of LCCs serving market r at time t (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ); and the market 
concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in market r 
at time t (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟). LCC-related variables are included because LCCs tend to have a 
smaller network size and offer less expensive tickets than legacy carriers; LCC 
entry can result in a spurious positive relationship between the average network 
size and the average fare in a market. 
 
  B. Data 
 
There are two main data sources for the empirical analysis. First, the airline data 
is obtained from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT). The Airline Origin and Destination (O&D) Survey Data 
Bank 1B (DB1B) is a 10% random sample of tickets used during each quarter and 
7We do not know the total number of flights that a carrier serves from an origin airport to a destination airport 
because capacity data is available only for direct flights. 
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contains information on fares and other ticket characteristics, such as origins, 
destinations, ticketing carriers, numbers of passengers, numbers of connections (i.e., 
the number of coupons used in an itinerary), whether a ticket is a round-trip ticket, 
and so on, at the itinerary level. Capacity data such as the number of available seats 
and the number of flights are obtained from the T-100 database. Unlike the O&D 
data, only direct flights are counted in the capacity data. Second, data on Internet 
use is obtained from various supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
of the U.S. Census Bureau. This survey has asked questions about Internet use 
sporadically since 1997. 
This paper examines air travel between airports in the 50 most populated 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) during the 2000s, when Internet use 
increased rapidly. The list of MSAs ranked by population as of 2000 is available 
from the U.S. Census Bureau. All major airports in the MSAs and any minor 
airports within a 75-mile radius of the major airports are included. Data on Internet 
use is available for six years between 2000 and 2010 (2000, 2001, 2003, 2007, 
2009, and 2010). The surveys asked whether anyone in a household had Internet 
access at any location. The Internet penetration rate is computed as the fraction of 
people answering “yes” to this question. In addition, for 2001 and 2003, the 
surveys also asked whether the respondent searched for a product online. Internet 
use varies across MSAs and over time. As a robustness check, we measure the 
proportion of people who engaged in online searches for products instead of the 
proportion of people having Internet access. We restrict our attention to six years in 
the 2000s, specifically 2000, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009 and 2010. 
The selection criteria are not related to the level or the change in search and 
switching costs, and the sample is large enough to cover over 70% of passengers in 
a quarter. Figure 1 shows that, over time, the average Internet use increases and the 
average fare decreases, whereas the average network size does not change much. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis are shown in 
Table 1. 
 
 
FIGURE 1. INTERNET PENETRATION RATES, NETWORK SIZES, AND FARES OVER TIME 
 
Notes: Internet Use is the Internet penetration rate, Network (direct) is the average number of destinations of 
airlines served by a direct flight, and Network (all) is the average number of destinations of airlines served by any 
flight (including connecting services). Details about the variables are given in Section IV.A. 
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS  
  Variable Mean SD Min. Max. No. obs 
 Fare (2000$100) 1.86 0.73 0.22 18.39 114,727    Internet 0.54 0.09 0.30  0.73   
  Network (100 destinations) 0.10 0.08 0.00  0.51   
  Internet·Network 0.05 0.04 0.00  0.28   
              
Average 
product 
characteristics 
  
ExtraMiles 
(1000 miles) 0.08 0.09 0.00  2.31   
Direct 0.37 0.39 0.00  1.00   
Round 0.74 0.16 0.00  1.00   
            
Market  
Structure 
  
  
LCCin 0.59 0.49 0.00  1.00   
NumLCC 0.83 0.84 0.00  6.00   
HHI 0.53 0.26 0.05  1.00   
        Distance (1000 miles) 1.17 0.70 0.02  2.72   
  Distance_sqrd 1.86 1.93 0.00  7.42   
              
Alternative measures of network size  
           
Total No. of destinations 
(both direct/connecting 
flights) 
 
Network 
(100 destinations) 0.44 0.09 0.01  0.68   
Total No. of 
direct flights 
Network  
(1000 flights) 0.38 0.37 0.00  2.69   
              
Different measures of internet use            
  OnlineSearch 0.34 0.04 0.24  0.50 38.577 OnlineSearch·Network 0.15 0.04 0.00  0.28   
 
 
V. Results and Discussion 
  
Main regression results are presented in Table 2. We estimate different 
specifications regarding the inclusion of network and Internet variables. All 
specifications include market-quarter fixed effects and time fixed effects, although 
the related estimates are not reported in the table. 
In specification (1), we see the effect of Internet penetration rates, excluding the 
average network size. The average fare is found to be significantly and negatively 
associated with the average Internet penetration rate; a 10 percentage point increase 
in the average Internet penetration rate is associated with a lower average fare by 
approximately 4.4%. 
In specification (2), we disregard Internet penetration rates and note the effect of 
the average network size. The result shows that the route-average fare is 
significantly higher with a larger average network size of airlines on a route. When 
all competing airlines on a route serve ten more destinations with direct flights 
(that is, Network increases by 0.1), the average fare is expected to increase by 8.2%, 
holding all other factors constant. 
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TABLE 2—MAIN REGRESSION RESULTS 
   Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Variable Dependent variable: Log (Fare) 
   Network (100 destinations) 
  0.816*** 0.811*** 0.232*** 
    (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0762) 
   Internet -0.441***  -0.427*** -0.506***       (0.0339)  (0.0338) (0.0361)    Internet·Network    1.156*** 
      (0.135) 
         
Average 
product 
characteristics 
(No. of passengers 
weighted) 
 ExtraMiles (1000 miles) 
0.119*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0243) 
 Direct -0.126*** -0.197*** -0.197*** -0.198*** 
   (0.00833) (0.00839) (0.00838) (0.00837) 
 Round -0.241*** -0.229*** -0.233*** -0.242*** 
     (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0122)        
Market 
structure  
LCCin -0.106*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.109*** 
   (0.00402) (0.00398) (0.00397) (0.00397) 
   NumLCC -0.0424*** -0.0402*** -0.0402*** -0.0392***      (0.00185) (0.00181) (0.00181) (0.00182)    HHI 0.151*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.109***      (0.00847) (0.00868) (0.00869) (0.00870)    Constant 1.152*** 0.932*** 1.105*** 1.156***      (0.0183) (0.0121) (0.0183) (0.0202)             Observations 0114,727 0114,727 0114,727 0114,727    R-squared 0.351 0.358 0.360 0.361 
   
Number of market-quarter 
pairs 019,981 019,981 019,981 019,981 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; year-quarter dummies included 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the10 percent level. 
 
 
In specification (3), we include both 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼  and 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁  in one 
specification. The result shows that the respective coefficient estimates on the two 
variables are unaffected, implying that 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 and 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 are uncorrelated. 
Lastly, in specification (4), we add an interaction term between the Internet 
penetration rate and the network size. The coefficient estimate of 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 
becomes much smaller. Meanwhile, the estimate of the effect of the Internet is 
greater (that is, more negative) and the interaction term (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 ∙ 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁) is 
positive and significant. When evaluated at the mean value of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼, an 
increase in 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 by 0.1 corresponds to an increase in the average fare by 
8.5%.8 A large fraction of the positive impact of the network size on fares seems to 
come from the moderation of the negative impact of the Internet. When evaluated 
at the mean value of 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁, an increase in 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 by 0.1 (that is, an 
increase of 10 percentage points) corresponds to a decrease in the average fare by 
3.9%. The result implies that the pure Internet effect is likely to be underestimated 
when the network size is not taken into account. 
8This value is computed as “Estimated coefficient on Network+estimated coefficient on Internet·Network× 
mean value of Internet.” 
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Recall that the average Internet penetration rate is used to capture search costs 
(as measured inversely) and that the average network size of all airlines on a route 
is used as a proxy for switching costs. We then interpret the regression results in 
the context of the price effects of search and switching costs. We find that prices 
tend to increase with search costs and switching costs. When the interaction 
between search costs and switching costs is considered, a search cost reduction is 
found to have a greater, negative impact on prices. The significant and positive 
effect of the interaction term implies that switching costs lessen the negative effect 
of the search cost reduction on prices. 
The results imply that switching costs are not high enough to lock in consumers 
fully. If people never switch due to high switching costs, reduced search costs 
should only increase the investing incentive, while the harvesting incentive would 
remain unaffected. Considering that the investing incentive increases with the 
switching cost, decreasing search costs will lead to a deeper price cut in the 
presence of larger switching costs. We then expect to find a negative coefficient for 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 ∙ 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁, which is not the case in this empirical analysis. 
We interpret the positive relationship between fares and the interaction term as 
an indication that (1) switching costs are not substantial such that switching may 
take place; (2) switching costs still allow firms to sustain their lock-in power longer 
and thus maintain higher prices while search costs are declining; and (3) the 
investing incentive enhanced by switching costs does not outweigh the increased 
harvesting incentive. In sum, the empirical results support the general belief that 
the reduction in search costs associated with increasing Internet use would 
intensify competition, but switching costs would moderate the impact. 
The other estimates appear reasonable. With more actual miles flown, fares are 
higher on average (see 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸). This may arise because it is more costly to 
operate a flight or because the competitive pressure is generally low when 
consumers have to offset a longer distance with connecting flights on average. A 
higher proportion of direct-flight or round-trip tickets is negatively associated with 
the route-average fare (see 𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 and 𝑅𝑅𝑙𝑙𝑁𝑁𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅), which reflects that direct flights 
and round-trip tickets are generally offered to consumers at the same or lower 
prices as compared to connecting flights and one-way tickets respectively. The 
signs of the estimated coefficients on market-structure variables are as predicted: 
the presence of LCCs tends to lower the average fare (see 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼 and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿); 
and the average fare tends to be higher in a more concentrated market (see H𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿). 
At this stage, we determine if there are other explanations for the results. First, 
consumers may exhibit different degrees of lock-in. For example, business 
travelers fly more frequently, and they also tend to be less price-sensitive as 
compared to leisure travelers. The value of FFPs (here, the network size) will be 
more relevant to business travelers. Thus, the positive relationship between 
Network and fares could indicate price discrimination. If airlines tend to provide a 
more extensive network in a market with more business travelers, the positive 
coefficient on the interaction term between Network and Internet may be driven by 
the fact that business travelers are not heavily affected by the Internet (as they are 
less price-sensitive). We control for consumer heterogeneity across markets by 
adding route-quarter fixed effects. By doing so, we address consumer heterogeneity 
to the extent to which it varies across markets but is constant over time. Aggregate 
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shocks to consumer heterogeneity are taken into account by including year 
dummies. 
Table 3 presents the estimation results with additional variables to consider other 
factors that may be related to the interaction between Internet and Network. 
Specification (A1) adds a linear time trend (Time) and an interaction term 
between the linear time trend and the average network size (Network ∙ Time) to 
the main specification. In the 2000s, legacy network carriers’ market power 
weakened and fares decreased, whereas the Internet penetration rate increased. 
Thus, the negative effect of the Internet may be capturing the trend of decreasing 
fares, and the negative effect of the interaction term between Internet use and the 
average network size may be a spurious relationship arising from the decreasing 
market power of legacy carriers. We include time-trend variables to account for  
 
TABLE 3—ROBUSTNESS CHECKS - TIME TREND AND LCC PRESENCE  
Specification 
Variables 
 
 Main  
 
  (A1)   (A2) 
   
Time 
trend   
LCC 
presence 
  Network  0.232***  -0.221**  0.202*** (100 destinations)   (0.076)  (0.109)  (0.077) Internet  -0.506***  -0.614***  -0.617***    (0.036)  (0.043)  (0.039) Internet 
·Network  
1.156***  2.236***  1.028*** 
 (0.135)  (0.237)  (0.134) 
        ExtraMiles 
(1000 miles)  
0.115***  0.113***  0.120*** 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) Direct  -0.198***  -0.198***  -0.192*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) Round   -0.242***  -0.239***  -0.237***    (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) LCCin  -0.109***  -0.109***  -0.278***    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.018) NumLCC  -0.039***  -0.039***  -0.005 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.009) HHI  0.109***  0.110***  0.110*** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)         Time    -0.019***        (0.001)   Network 
·Time     
-0.026***   
   (0.006)   
LCCin 
·Internet       
0.317*** 
     (0.033) 
NumLCC 
·Internet       
-0.065*** 
     (0.016) 
             Market-quarter FE   included  included  included Observations  114,727  114,727  114,727 R-squared  0.361  0.361  0.362 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; year-quarter dummies included 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the10 percent level. 
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this potential problem. Indeed 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹and 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 are negatively associated 
with the average fare, but including time-trend variables does not change the main 
finding that the fare decrease associated with increasing Internet use is lessened by 
high switching costs. 
Specification (A2) includes the interaction between the Internet and the variables 
related to the presence of LCCs. Network is negatively associated with the 
presence of LCCs, and so Internet ∙ Network may capture the Internet effect in 
the presence of LCCs. On the one hand, consumers may be able to find the 
inexpensive products of LCCs more easily using the Internet; thus, the effect of the 
Internet on prices may be more prominent when LCCs are present. On the other 
hand, because the products of LCCs are generally known to be inexpensive, 
consumers may search for the price information of LCCs anyway and thus the 
Internet may have less of an impact on consumer search behavior in the presence of 
LCCs. These factors can potentially lead to biased estimations of the effects of the 
interaction term; it will be overestimated in the former case and underestimated in 
the latter case. The result shows that the effect of Internet use tends to be smaller in 
the presence of LCCs. However, as the number of LCCs increases, Internet use 
appears to drive down prices. After allowing for different effects of Internet in 
the presence of LCCs, we still have similar estimates of the effects of Internet, Network, and the interaction between those variables, finding that the Internet 
lowers prices but that the price drop is smaller when the average network size is 
larger. 
The regression results are dependent on the measure of the network size and on 
the measure of Internet use. We used different measures of these variables in the 
robustness checks, and these results are presented in Table 4. As a proxy for 
switching costs in relation to FFPs (𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁), we also use the average number of 
destinations served by airlines by any flight - direct, indirect, and code-sharing 
flights - (Specifications (B1) and (B2)) and the average number of direct flights at 
the endpoint airports (Specifications (B3) and (B4)). Details are given in Section 
Ⅳ.A. The difference in the estimates of the Internet with and without 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 ∙
𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 is much larger, and the estimate of 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 is insignificant when we 
take into account all destinations (as compared to main results (3) and (4) in Table 
2). Unlike the measure based on the direct network size, this measure (based on all 
destinations) is likely to capture the pro-competitive effects of code-sharing and a 
hub-and-spoke system as well. Firms may achieve major cost reductions through 
code-sharing, and code-sharing on complementary routes may resolve the double 
marginalization problem. In this sense, this result suggests that network size 
including all destinations (through direct, indirect, or code-sharing flights) captures 
more of the effect of double marginalization, while the effect of inhibiting the 
competitive effect of the Internet remains. The main finding is also confirmed 
when the number of direct flights is used (Specifications (B3) and (B4)). 
We use the proportion of people having Internet access as a proxy for low search 
costs. For 2001 and 2003, however, we have extra information regarding Internet 
use. The survey additionally asks if the respondent searched for a product online to 
purchase at any point over the past year. We use the average of the proportion of 
people engaging in an online search in the regions in which the endpoint airports of 
a market are located as a proxy for low search costs (Specifications (B5)~(B8)). 
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TABLE 4—ROBUSTNESS CHECK - DIFFERENT MEASURES OF 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 OR 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 
Specification 
Variables 
 
 
 
 
  (B1) (B2)   (B3) (B4)   (B5) (B6) (B7) (B8) 
  All destinations   Flight frequency   Online search 
  (100 destinations)   (1000 flights)     
  Dependent variable: Log (Average Fare) 
Network   0.583*** 0.029  0.139*** 0.069***   0.296*** 0.332*** -0.438*     (0.022) (0.067)  (0.007) (0.015)   (0.108) (0.108) (0.244)     -0.449*** -0.877***  -0.424*** -0.466***      Internet   (0.034) (0.063)  (0.034) (0.036)           1.067***   0.149***      Internet 
·Network 
   (0.126)   (0.028)      
            
              OnlineSearch        -0.399***  -0.443*** -0.655***           (0.118)  (0.118) (0.134) OnlineSearch 
·Network           
2.286*** 
         (0.695) 
              ExtraMiles   0.123*** 0.134***  0.107*** 0.114***  0.143** 0.141** 0.137** 0.141** (1000 miles)   (0.024) (0.024)  (0.024) (0.024)  (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) Direct   -0.089*** -0.081***  -0.169*** -0.170***  -0.184*** -0.203*** -0.205*** -0.206***     (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) Round   -0.279*** -0.285***  -0.233*** -0.238***  -0.570*** -0.573*** -0.572*** -0.572***     (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) LCCin   -0.097*** -0.098***  -0.109*** -0.109***  -0.149*** -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.148***     (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) NumLCC   -0.035*** -0.034***  -0.039*** -0.038***  -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027***     (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) HHI   0.104*** 0.104***  0.117*** 0.115***  0.128*** 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.113***     (0.008) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) Constant   0.935*** 1.162***  1.112*** 1.138***  1.432*** 1.287*** 1.429*** 1.500***     (0.020) (0.034)  (0.018) (0.020)  (0.045) (0.025) (0.045) (0.050)                         
Observations  114,727 114,727  114,727 114,727  38,577 38,577 38,577 38,577 R-squared   0.363 0.364  0.357 0.357  0.272 0.272 0.272 0.273 No. of market-
quarters  19,981 19,981  19,981 19,981  4,975 4,975 4,975 4,975 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; year-quarter dummies included 
*** significant at the 1 percent level.  
** significant at the 5 percent level. 
* significant at the10 percent level. 
 
 
Suppressing a time notation, we compute 
 
𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑟=
1
2
(𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟), 
 
where 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟
𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 (𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟) denotes the proportion of people who search 
online in the region in which the origin (destination) airport of market r is located. 
The number of observations is reduced, as we cover only two years for which data 
about online searches is available. Although the estimate of 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 is negative, 
the interaction term 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 is much larger and positive, as is 
the network effect evaluated at any value of Internet in the sample. The effect of 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼  is negative and the estimated coefficient of 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐ℎ  is 
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significantly more negative when 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁 is included 
(Specification (B8) as compared to Specification (B7)). Overall, the main findings 
are robust to this alternative measure and the use of a subsample. 
The results have academic as well as practical implications. First, the 
comparison between the estimated coefficients of 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 with and without the 
interaction term, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 ∙ 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁  (that is, specifications (1) and (3) vs. 
specification (4)) suggests that estimation of the search cost effect ignoring the 
interaction with switching costs in determining the market price may be biased. 
Specifically, in the airline industry, we see that the negative effect of a search cost 
reduction on prices is underestimated when the interaction with switching costs is 
omitted. 
Second, we take search and switching costs as exogenously given when 
interpreting empirical results in this paper. In some industries, however, firms may 
be able to affect these costs. In particular, Internet use is believed to have lowered 
consumers’ search costs dramatically, and firms have feared that this would 
intensify competition. Firms may respond to the decrease in search costs by 
increasing switching costs. By doing so, firms will be more likely to maintain high 
prices, and the potential price cut from the decrease in search costs will not be fully 
realized. 
In this sense, policymakers would need to take into account the possibility that 
the effectiveness of a policy affecting one of the costs can be undermined by firms’ 
responses, altering the size of the other cost. In the context of the airline industry, 
switching costs are the product of firms’ marketing strategies and are rather out of 
the reach of policymakers. Given this policy restriction, policymakers would find it 
easier to alter search costs. Let us suppose that policymakers attempt to lower 
search costs and that the search cost reduction is comparable to 10%p increase in 
the average Internet penetration rate. Taking the estimates from the main empirical 
result, we can compute the number of destinations firms need to add to offset the 
effect of the lowered search costs. As mentioned earlier, a 10%p increase in 
Internet use corresponds to a 3.9% fare cut. Roughly speaking, firms can offset the 
fare decrease by raising switching costs by an amount that is comparable to the 
addition of 4.6 more destinations.9 This implies that the policy can be rather easily 
nullified by firms. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper investigates the price effect of reduced search costs in the presence of 
switching costs in the context of the effect of the Internet on airfares. How a 
decrease in search costs would affect prices and whether switching costs would 
amplify or mitigate the effect are theoretically unclear. Results with U.S. domestic 
airfares show that decreased search costs associated with increasing Internet usage 
has led to more competition, but switching costs measured in terms of the average 
9This value is computed as “Estimated coefficient on Internet + estimated coefficient on Internet·Network× 
mean value of Network”×change in Internet use (here, 10%p) divided by “Estimated coefficient on Network + 
estimated coefficient on Internet·Network×mean value of Internet”. 
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network size have moderated this effect. When the airline industry was deregulated 
in 1978, industry experts argued that network sizes would be the key strength of 
incumbent airlines to survive. This still applies to struggling legacy airlines in the 
current periods. In the Internet era, the empirical result suggests that their networks 
would help airlines to weather the storm. 
The results of this paper suggest that search and switching costs work in a 
similar fashion and when combined, they determine prices. In this case, one of the 
costs can influence the price effect of the other cost. If we do not consider both 
costs when estimating the magnitude or significance of each cost or when 
predicting the effects of changes in these costs, the empirical results would likely 
be biased. 
It is also suggested that policymakers give serious consideration to the 
interaction between search and switching costs when designing and implementing 
policies which affect one of these costs. Firms’ reactions to offset the policy effect 
should be taken into account. Otherwise, the policy may become ineffective or 
have unexpected consequences. 
We need to note that the interpretation of the empirical result was based on the 
assumption that search and switching costs are exogenously given. It would be 
easy to justify exogenous search costs related to the Internet. However, FFPs are 
endogenously determined by airlines, and their values are dependent on consumer 
usage. That is, airlines decide how many benefits to give (or not) to consumers 
based on their past usage. In this case, the literature shows that equilibrium prices 
decline over time (see Caminal and Matutes (1990) and Rhee (2014)). That is, 
consumers experience fare decreases throughout the consumption cycle as they 
accumulate miles and use them to earn free tickets. In this sense, the empirical 
result in this paper does not mean that consumer welfare will decrease, as the fare 
cuts associated with reduced search costs may not be fully realized in the presence 
of switching costs. The impact on consumer welfare is rather ambiguous when 
switching costs are endogenously determined.  
This paper does not provide a formal theory. A formal theory that includes both 
search costs and switching costs in one framework will be useful to generate 
specific predictions of the price effects of search and switching costs. Whether and 
how a price effect of a search cost reduction will be affected by switching costs 
will become clearer. Moreover, a formal theoretical framework will enable us to 
conduct more robust empirical studies regarding this relationship. 
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